Question

read the excerpt from freakonomics.

its worth thinking about the incentive a wrestler might have to throw a match. maybe he accepts a bribe (which would obviously not be recorded in the data). or perhaps some other arrangement is made between the two wrestlers. keep in mind that the pool of elite sumo wrestlers is extraordinarily tight - knit. each of the sixty - six elite wrestlers fights fifteen of the others in a tournament every two months. furthermore, each wrestler belongs to a stable that is typically managed by a former sumo champion, so even the rival stables have close ties.

which of the following claims is best supported by the evidence in this excerpt?

the offering of a bribe is a guaranteed enticement for a champion sumo wrestler to purposely lose a match in a tournament.
the close relationship between sumo wrestlers could be an incentive for an elite wrestler to throw a match he doesnt need to win.
because sumo wrestlers have strong social ties, it is a dishonor to throw a match in a tournament.
there is great pressure for sumo wrestlers to cheat in order to beat wrestlers from rival stables.

Explanation:

The excerpt notes elite sumo wrestlers are tight-knit, fight frequently, and rival stables have close ties, while mentioning incentives to throw matches (like bribes or arrangements between wrestlers).

• The first option is incorrect because the text only says a bribe is a possible incentive, not a "guaranteed" one.
• The third option is wrong; the excerpt does not mention dishonesty related to throwing matches, only incentives for doing so.
• The fourth option is incorrect, as the text states rival stables have close ties, not that there is pressure to cheat against them.
• The second option aligns: the close relationships could enable arrangements (a non-bribe incentive) for a wrestler to throw a match they don't need to win.

Answer:

The close relationship between sumo wrestlers could be an incentive for an elite wrestler to throw a match he doesn't need to win.